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THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS TO A
SHARED REFLECTION: THE EVOLVING
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
FINANCIAL REGULATION
GILLIAN E. METZGER*
Administrative law and financial regulation have an uneasy relationship
today. It was not always so. Indeed, the two were closely intertwined at the
nation’s birth. The Treasury Department was a major hub of early federal
administration, with Alexander Hamilton crafting the first iterations of federal
administrative law in his oversight of revenue generation and customs
1
collection. One hundred and fifty years later, administrative law and financial
regulation were conjoined in the New Deal’s creation of the modern
administrative state. This time it was James Landis, Chair of the newly formed
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and author of the leading defense
of the new federal administrative government, who embodied the connection
2
between administrative law and financial regulation. And the two fields have
crossed paths periodically since, as demonstrated by the financial regulation
3
decisions that have canonical status in administrative law and vice versa. Nor is
this overlapping relationship surprising; financial regulation is, after all, a form
of administrative governance to which the general transsubstantive
requirements of administrative law would naturally apply.
Yet in many ways administrative law and financial regulation now stand
poles apart. They are divided not simply by their separation in law school
curricula and faculty, but even more by opposite precepts and framing
principles. Indeed, there is almost a through-the-looking-glass quality when
4
approaching financial regulation with an administrative law lens. In modern
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1. JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 40–42, 112 (2012).
2. See generally JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (7th ed. 1966).
3. See, e.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
4. By administrative law, I mean to include not simply measures that are typically identified as
part of federal administrative law, such as the Administrative Procedure Act and judicial review
doctrines, but also substantive nonfinancial regulatory schemes, like the Clean Air Act, that are often
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U.S. administrative law, notice-and-comment rulemaking, frequently on matters
of great scientific or technological uncertainty, is the paradigmatic example of
administrative action. The goal of such regulation often is to compensate for
market deficiencies—to force industries to internalize the costs of their actions
and to protect the public or particular groups from harms they lack the ability
to avoid or foresee. Accountability is administrative law’s central obsession,
which it furthers through mechanisms for public participation, congressional
5
oversight, centralized White House regulatory review, and judicial review. Fear
of agency capture is a recurring theme, as is the concern that agencies will wield
6
their delegated powers arbitrarily.
A very different model dominates in the world of financial regulation. There
the defining structural precept is not accountability but independence. The vast
majority of financial regulators enjoy protection from removal from office,
often coupled with budgetary autonomy from Congress and other indicia of
7
independence, such as exemption from White House regulatory oversight. Far
from fearing agency capture, financial regulatory agencies seem structured to
invite it, with a number of agencies being given authority over narrow industry
8
slices and being made financially dependent on industry fees. Much financial
regulation displays a collaborative approach, with greater reliance on
information sharing and partnership between regulators and those they
9
regulate. Although financial regulation agencies engage in notice-and-comment
rulemaking, their regulatory mode is often more informal, ad hoc, and hidden
10
from public view. Protecting vulnerable groups and preventing externalities
are important concerns, but an overriding regulatory goal is ensuring the
stability of the financial system, which often means protecting profitable lines of

viewed as part of distinct substantive fields, internal executive-branch practices and structures that
overlap with public administration, as well as administrative law scholarship. My contrast is thus
perhaps better described as one between financial regulation and the rest of administrative
government, rather than administrative law per se. I use the term administrative law, however, in part
to signal that these other dimensions are core aspects of the field, even if pushed to the edges of
traditional administrative law courses.
5. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 469, 472–74, 481–85, 488–91 (2003).
6. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
1749, 1760, 1786 (2007); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1050–53 (1997).
7. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89
TEX. L. REV. 15, 26–27, 42–43 (2010).
8. See Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and The Regulation of Financial
Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 2042–49 (2014) (detailing tendencies towards
capture in financial regulation).
9. See id. at 2043–44 (“The relationship between banking regulators and financial institutions is
sometimes more symbiotic than supervisory.”); David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 187, 208–10 (2010).
10. E.g., Zaring, supra note 9, at 199–201; Ben Protess, Lawsuit Challenges Government’s $13
Billion Deal With JPMorgan, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2014, 5:54 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/
02/10/justice-department-sued-over-13-billion-jpmorgan-pact.
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11

business. The market plays a different role, too, acting as much as an arbiter of
successful financial regulation as the object of regulators’ attention. Put
differently, rather than viewing the marketplace with skepticism as a place of
industry exploitation, financial regulation aims to free financial markets to work
their magic.
To be sure, these models of administrative law and financial regulation
represent incomplete accounts of both fields. Market-based regulation has long
been a staple of standard administrative law, as has reliance on informal and
collaborative governance mechanisms. Interest-group influence is a constant at
all agencies, and independent agencies are neither limited to the financial sector
12
nor immune from presidential oversight. Significant differences in structure,
jurisdiction, and regulatory approach exist among different financial regulators
and among the large and diverse group of nonfinancial regulators.
But even though these characterizations exaggerate the divergence between
administrative law and financial regulation, they help to demonstrate the
upside-down aspect that each field can possess when viewed from the other.
The contrast also helps elucidate the contingent and contestable nature of each
field’s framing presumptions, thereby opening up room for rethinking
approaches to regulation in both. Indeed, that rethinking is already underway
largely as a result of the financial crisis, and many of the starker differences
between the two fields are abating.
The time is thus ripe for sustained and reciprocal engagement between
administrative law and financial regulation at both a conceptual and more
granular level. This article aims to contribute to that process of mutual
reflection. Part I begins with a description of two agencies that typify
administrative law and financial regulation and uses that description to
showcase the core precepts and structures that characterize each field. Part II
focuses in on recent developments in financial regulation and administrative
law, identifying the ways that these changes are increasingly erasing the
differences between the two fields. Part III then details some lessons that each
field could glean from the other.
I
A STUDY IN CONTRASTS
Every field has its archetypes. The differences between administrative law
and financial regulation become apparent when contrasting two agencies that in
many ways stand as archetypes of each field: the Environmental Protection

11. Cf. CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS & STEPHEN H. HABER, FRAGILE BY DESIGN: THE POLITICAL
ORIGINS OF BANKING CRISES AND SCARCE CREDIT, 274–76 (2014) (discussing the Fed putting
primacy on monetary policy over financial regulation).
12. See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive
Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 813–17 (2012); Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not–So
Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459,
497–98 (2008).
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Agency (EPA) and the Federal Reserve (The Fed).
Staffed with 16,000 employees and charged with broad responsibility for
protecting the nation’s environment, the EPA’s regulatory scope is vast. The
EPA implements numerous major environmental statutes, including the Clean
Air and Clean Water Acts; issues national standards for a wide array of
pollutants; distributes significant amounts in grants; and oversees toxic
13
chemicals, pesticides, and clean-ups. The matters it addresses frequently
involve complicated issues of scientific uncertainty, future impact, and
technological capacity. Statutorily mandated to set many of its requirements by
legislative or notice-and-comment rulemaking, EPA rules often have a
substantial impact on the environment and economy. As a result, they are often
14
highly contentious and trigger both substantial political scrutiny and litigation.
The EPA is headed by a single administrator who is removable by the President
at will and given cabinet status, with top administrators also being presidentially
15
appointed and Senate confirmed.
The Fed is larger than the EPA in personnel—above 18,500—and exercises
even more immediate and profound influence on the national economy, given
16
its control over the nation’s monetary policy. Its other core responsibilities
include supervising and regulating banking institutions; maintaining the stability
of the financial system; and providing financial services to depository
17
institutions, the U.S. government, and foreign official institutions. The Fed is a
national banking system, consisting of twelve regional Federal Reserve banks
and a Board of Governors at the top. The seven members of the Board of
Governors are appointed by the President with Senate confirmation to
fourteen-year terms and are protected against removal from office except for
18
cause. Like the EPA, the Fed often addresses matters of significant
uncertainty. It also issues notice-and-comment rules, particularly with respect to
its bank supervision, financial stability, and financial services responsibilities.

13. Our Mission and What We Do, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-wedo (last visited Apr. 4, 2015) [hereinafter Our Mission and What We Do].
14. See, e.g., Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S.Ct. 2427 (2014) (challenge to EPA’s
greenhouse-gas-permitting requirements); Juliet Eilperin & Steven Mufson, EPA Proposes Cutting
Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Coal Plants by 30% by 2030, WASH. POST (June 2, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/epa-to-propose-cutting-carbon-dioxideemissions-from-coal-plants-30percent-by-2030/2014/06/01/f5055d94-e9a8-11e3-9f5c9075d5508f0a_story.html.
15. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (July 9, 1970) (issued pursuant to 5
U.S.C. § 901); 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012).
16. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, ANNUAL REPORT:
BUDGET REVIEW (2013) (indicating personnel numbers), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
publications/budget-review/files/2013-budget-review.pdf.
OF
GOVERNORS
OF
THE
FED.
RESERVE
SYS.,
17. Mission,
BD.
http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2015).
18. Peter Conti-Brown, The Institutions of Federal Reserve Independence 36 (Rock Center for
Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 139, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2275759. Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation are similarly
required for selection of the Fed Chair and Vice-Chair, who are also members of the Board. Id.
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But much of the Fed’s policysetting and supervisory activity takes a more
informal and ad hoc guise, and such Fed decisions are rarely formally subject to
19
political approval ex ante or undergo judicial review ex post. Perhaps an even
more significant factor is the Fed’s budgetary autonomy, with the Fed funding
20
itself primarily through income generated by its open market operations.
These are, of course, only two of myriad federal agencies, and they lack
many features characteristic of others. The EPA is nowhere near as large as
military and security agencies like the Departments of Defense, Veterans
Affairs, and Homeland Security, and several important nonfinancial regulatory
agencies, like the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) or the Federal
Energy Regulatiory Commission (FERC), are headed by multiperson boards
21
whose members serve terms and enjoy for cause–removal protection. The Fed,
in turn, differs significantly from other financial regulators because of its central
engagement with monetary policy. This monetary policy role also leads to an
overall systemic focus on the part of the Fed compared to other financial
22
regulators who train their attention on particular financial sectors. Another
divergence exists between banking regulators, like the Fed or Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and other financial regulators such as the SEC
or the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which lack the
23
budgetary autonomy that bank regulators enjoy.
Nonetheless, what makes the EPA and the Fed archetypal of administrative
law and financial regulation respectively is the extent to which each embodies
the core obsessions and concerns of its field. With the advent of major new
public-interest regulatory legislation in the 1960s and 1970s, the focus on
administrative law shifted from economic regulation and ratemaking to noticeand-comment rulemaking on complex scientific and technological issues of the
24
kind that the EPA undertakes. There the focus has remained, with both
doctrines and scholarship keying to rulemaking as the paradigmatic
administrative activity. The EPA also is emblematic of administrative law’s
central struggles to guard against agency capture, balance political and legal
19. This was particularly true of the Fed’s critical moves during the recent financial crisis. Steven
M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government's Response to the Financial Crisis,
61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 477–79 (2009); see also Zaring, supra note 9, at 208–09 (Treasury’s regulatory
approach).
20. Conti-Brown, supra note 18, at 22; BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM, supra note 16, at 2.
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 7171(b)(1) (2012) (FERC); 47 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012) (FCC).
22. See Kathryn Judge, Three Discount Windows, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 795, 808–09 (2014);
Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure 14, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Mar.
2008),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf
[hereinafter
Blueprint].
23. Joel Seligman, Self-Funding for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 NOVA L. REV.
233, 238–49, 253–54 (2004) (describing SEC’s lack of independent funding and impact of inadequate
resources on the agency). The SEC and CFTC also rely more on rulemaking and are more frequently
subject to suit. See infra text accompanying note 68.
24. Merrill, supra note 6, at 1092–93; Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical
Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1284–95 (1986).
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accountability with administrative expertise, and improve the regulatory
process through analytic requirements. In addition, disputes over EPA rules
often play out in the public eye, amidst allegations of lost jobs and growing
pollution-caused health crises such as childhood asthma. The Fed, meanwhile,
represents the apogee of independence that is the traditional hallmark of
25
financial regulation. Its methods of operation are particularly tied to the
financial markets and are distinctive to financial regulation as opposed to other
administrative contexts. And its central role in the economy gives it a broader
import and greater popular stature than any other national financial regulator, a
26
role that has only expanded after the recent financial crisis.
Comparing the EPA and the Fed highlights four central areas of contrast
between administrative law and financial regulation: (1) administrative
structure and institutional design; (2) relationships to other regulators; (3)
regulatory methods and approaches; and (4) the role of the market. Yet at the
same time, closer analysis reveals greater similarity on these fronts than might
at first appear. The net effect is to situate administrative law and financial
regulation not at diamterically opposite regulatory poles but rather at different,
yet sometimes overlapping, points on a regulatory spectrum.
A. Administrative Structure and Institutional Design
Perhaps the most immediate and obvious difference between the EPA and
the Fed involves the two agencies’ structures. A common distinction among
federal administrative agencies is between executive agencies and independent
agencies, with independence referring to protection against presidential and, to
27
a lesser extent, congressional control. Recently several scholars have argued
that agency independence (or lack thereof) is actually a function of a number of
factors, including budgetary autonomy, bipartisan and multimember
composition, and the extent of substantive oversight in addition to removal
protection. Agency independence thus needs to be assessed on a continuum
rather than on a binary basis, with different combinations of structural features
resulting in agencies enjoying different degrees of independence from political
28
oversight.
The contrast between the EPA and the Fed is stark whether the distinction
is viewed in binary terms or from a more scalar perspective. The Fed and many
other financial regulators enjoy numerous indicia of independence: not just
removal protection and (in the case of the Fed) lengthy terms, but also
25. The formal independent status of the Fed is typical of financial regulators not just in the
United States but in many countries, particularly those with central banks. See Stavros Gadinis, From
Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation, 101 CAL. L. REV. 327, 331–32 (2013).
26. See Lawrence C. Baxter, Capture Nuances in Financial Regulation, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
537, 539, 545 (2012); Judge, supra note 22, at 805–06.
27. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63
VAND. L. REV. 599, 600 (2010) (“By design, independent agencies are insulated from the
plenary control of the President.”); Datla & Revesz, supra note 12, at 775–76, 778–81.
28. See Datla & Revesz, supra note 12, at 825–27.
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multimember composition, budgetary autonomy, freedom from White House
29
regulatory oversight, and norms of noninterference. The Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC), which sets monetary policy and consists of five regional
bank presidents who are selected by their banks’ shareholders as well as
members of the Board of Governors, is even more insulated from political
30
control. The EPA lacks these features. Not only is it headed by a single
administrator removable at will, but its rules frequently come in for extensive
White House review, and Presidents are often prominently involved in major
31
EPA policy decisions. Indeed, by some accounts, EPA rules are scrutinized
even when they do not appear to meet the economic significance threshold that
triggers greater scrutiny by the White House through the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), housed in the Office of Management and
32
Budget.
But digging deeper, the contrast in independence is not as sharp as it first
might appear. To begin with, there are features of the EPA’s structure and
operations that lend it more independence from political pressure than its
leadership structure might suggest. In particular, the large number of career
scientists staffing the agency, combined with internal rulemaking procedures
that both give staff a large role in assessing the scientific evidence and also
require participation by outside scientific advisors, transform professional
norms and professional reputation into a shield against politically driven
33
decisionmaking. Similar professional and civil-service protections and
reputational concerns operate within other nonfinancial regulators whose
34
leaders lack removal protection.
At the same time, the Fed’s protection from political influence can be
exaggerated. A striking feature of accounts of the Fed’s actions during the
recent financial crisis is the close working relationship between the Treasury
29. See Bressman & Thompson, supra note 27, at 611; Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency
Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1166 (2013).
30. Peter Conti-Brown, The Constitutional Crisis at the Fed, POLITICO (Apr. 13, 2014),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/04/federal-reserve-constitutional-crisis105663.html#.VEQm3YvF--Z.
31. See, e.g., Memorandum from President Barack Obama, Power Sector Carbon Pollution
Standards (June 25, 2013) (instructing the EPA to issue standards on greenhouse gasses from power
plants); Letter from Cass R. Sunstein, Admin., Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Lisa Jackson,
Admin., EPA (Sept. 2, 2011) (blocking the EPA’s effort to lower ozone-emission standards).
32. See Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider's Reflections on the Relationship Between
the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 346–47 (2014) (“Most of
the rules OIRA reviews are not economically significant.”).
33. See Emily Hammond & Daniel Markel, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review: Building
Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 353–55 (2013) (professional and
reputational forces); Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA's Air
Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 110–18 (2011) (describing staff role in rulemaking).
34. See, e.g., DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY:
REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 1862–1928, at 282–
87, 366 (2001) (describing use of professionalism in development of the Forest Service); Gillian E.
Metzger, Abortion, Equality, and Administrative Regulation, 56 EMORY L.J. 865, 901–02 (2007)
(describing role of professionalism at FDA).
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35

and the Fed. No doubt this relationship reflected the momentousness of the
Fed’s decisions for the economy at the time, but it also demonstrated the high36
level political attention and pressure that may be brought to bear on the Fed.
This political pressure comes as much or more from Congress as from the
President, with Congress influencing the Fed through hearings, confirmations,
37
and legislative mandates.
Moreover, as Peter Conti-Brown has argued, assessments of the Fed’s
independence need to address the question of audience, or, “independence
from whom?” Although the Fed is insulated from presidential and
congressional control and rarely subject to judicial review, it is structurally more
dependent on private banks. Private banks that hold stock in regional Federal
Reserve banks largely select the regional Feds’ boards of directors and
potentially can affect monetary policy through the presence of five regional
38
bank presidents on the FOMC. The Fed’s structural connections to member
banks is unusual, but many financial regulators enjoy close relationships with
particular industry sectors, supported by structural features of financial sector
regulation—specifically, the presence of multiple financial regulators, many
with fairly narrow jurisdiction and financial dependence on fees from those they
39
regulate.
These structural features fuel concerns that financial regulators are too
easily captured by the entities that they regulate and advance those entities’
40
interests at the expense of the public. To be sure, claims of capture are
periodically raised against nonfinancial regulators with particular industry
responsibilities, and the EPA has advisory committees that, along with frequent

35. See, e.g., ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL 394–95 (2010); DAVID WESSEL, IN FED
WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE’S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC 10–13 (2010); Bressman & Thompson,
supra note 27, at 626–30.
36. Now with FSOC, this attention is statutorily mandated. See infra Part III.
37. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765, § 125
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §5233 (2012) (creating the Congressional Oversight Panel); STEPHEN
H. AXILROD, INSIDE THE FED: MONETARY POLICY AND ITS MANAGEMENT 8–11 (2009); Sudeep
Reddy, The Fed Pick: Summers Fight Eases Yellen’s Confirmation, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 9, 2013, 6:00
AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2013/10/09/the-fed-pick-summers-fight-eases-yellensconfirmation.
38. See Conti-Brown, supra note 18, at 52–53 (discussing selection of regional-bank leadership and
influence of private banks); see also Conti-Brown, supra note 30 (private-bank influence on the FOMC,
which controls monetary policy).
39. See Barkow, supra note 7, at 50; Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and the Political
Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 99–100 (1992).
40. See James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING REGULATORY
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 74 (Daniel
Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2013) (detailing subtle cultural levers of influence in financial
regulation); Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in Financial
Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 629–31 (2012) (“Financial regulators often come to view their
institutional interests or mission as largely congruent with the interests of their regulated industry
constituency.”). But see Baxter, supra note 26, at 539, 543–49 (arguing that capture has limited analytic
purchase in bank regulation because of complexities of regulatory scheme and the quasi-public role of
banks).
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informal meetings, can serve as conduits for industry- or environmental-group
41
input analogous to the Fed’s relationship to private banks. Still, there is a
notable contrast between the model of large executive departments with broad
subject-area responsibility that often dominates the administrative law context
42
and the industry-specific model of financial regulation.
B. Relationships to Other Regulators
A second related contrast between the EPA and the Fed concerns their
relationships to other regulators, both public and private. States play a critical
role in many federal environmental programs; they are responsible for
formulating state emission plans, issuing licenses and permits, and collaborating
43
on inspection and enforcement. It is hardly coincidental that four of the last
five appointed EPA administrators previously had played significant roles in
44
state government. The central importance of the states is true also of health,
welfare, and education programs, which are similarly structured on cooperative
45
federalism lines. States also play important roles in financial regulation; state
regulators bear primary responsibility for overseeing state-chartered banks,
insurance companies, and some financial intermediaries, and state attorneys
46
general undertake consumer financial protection enforcement actions.
Traditionally, however, federal and state financial regulators operate largely
independently, in relationships traditionally characterized more by regulatory
rivalry than by cooperation. Perhaps the clearest manifestation of this rivalry
came in recent efforts by federal regulators, in particular the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the now-defunct Office of Thrift

41. See All Federal Advisory Committees at EPA, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/faca/all-federaladvisory-committees-epa (last visited Apr. 4, 2015) (listing EPA advisory committees); see also Coral
Davenport, Taking Oil Industry Cue, Environmentalists Drew Emissions Blueprint, N.Y. TIMES (July 6,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/07/us/how-environmentalists-drew-blueprint-for-obamaemissions-rule.html (environmentalists’ role in developing Obama adminsitration’s carbon policy). On
mechanisms of interest group influence on the EPA and other nonfinancial regulators, see Cary
Coglianese, Litigating Within Relationships: Disputes and Disturbance in the Regulatory Process, 30
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 735, 749–51 (1996); Wagner supra note 33, at 104–09.
42. Again, these are overall tendencies at best. The separation of the National Park Service,
located in the Department of the Interior, and the U.S. Forest Service, located in the Department of
Agriculture, is a prominent counterexample. On the evolution and perpetuation of this divide, see
CARPENTER, supra note 34, at 8–10.
43. See, e.g., EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S.Ct. 1584, 1594–95, 1597–98 (2014)
(noting state implementation plan requirements under the Clean Air Act (CAA)); see also John P.
Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1190–92 (1995)
(describing the role of the states under the CAA); Our Mission and What We Do, supra note 13
(discussing role of states in EPA regulations, grants, and partnerships).
44. See Chronology of EPA Administrators, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/chronology-epaadministrators (last visited Apr. 4, 2015).
45. See Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C.
L. REV. 663, 665 (2001).
46. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd–Frank Act’s Expansion of State Authority to Protect
Consumers of Financial Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893, 909, 924, 949–51 (2011) (describing state
regulatory and enforcement actitivies addressing financial institutions and practices).
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47

Supervision, to preempt state oversight.
Similarly rivalrous relationships have characterized interactions among
federal financial regulators. Financial regulation in the United States is
48
notoriously fragmented. The presence of several federal financial regulators
with narrow oversight authority, combined with relatively easy movement from
one regulator’s purview to another’s and budgetary dependence on fees, has led
at times to competitive approaches among federal regulators, as well as between
49
federal and state regulators. Such turf battles are hardly unique to financial
regulation, and many nonfinancial regulatory schemes involve multiple
50
regulators. Indeed, the EPA shares regulatory authority with other agencies in
a number of key areas, such as with the Army Corps of Engineers over waters
51
and wetlands. Unlike the traditional pattern in financial regulation, however,
many of these overlaps represent instances of shared, rather than competitive,
regulatory responsibilities, with statutes mandating interagency collaboration
52
and consultation even when granting one agency primary regulatory authority.
Such shared arrangements can lead to duplicative regulation and high
coordination burdens, but they can also offer fewer opportunities for regulatory
53
arbitrage.
Financial and nonfinancial regulators also vary in their regulatory
interactions on the international plane. The Fed works closely with central
banks and financial overseers in other countries, particularly on monetary
54
policy but also on coordinated regulation among banks. To a large extent, this
is simply a reflection of the interconnected nature of financial markets today
and the easy flow of capital across national boundaries, a development
traceable to the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in
47. See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519 (2009); KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA
A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS
157–59 (2011).
48. Lawrence Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to Financial
Regulations, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 39, 49–56 (2009); Blueprint, supra note 22, at 32.
49. See Wilmarth, supra note 48, at 910–13, 915–16 (describing competition between federal
banking regualtors and resultant efforts to preempt state enforcement). But see Cunningham & Zaring,
supra note 48, at 42 (noting benefits).
50. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1131, 1145–50 (2012) (discussing different types of redundant regulation and providing
examples); Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 187–88 (2011) (providing
examples of duplicative regulation).
51. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012).
52. See Eric Biber, The More the Merrier: Multiple Agencies and the Future of Administrative Law
Scholarship, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 78, 80–81 (2012) (describing different models of shared regulation,
distinguishing collaborative from cooperative approaches); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 50, at 1145–
50.
53. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 50, at 1185–87; Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of
Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655,
1693–94 (2006) (explaining the consequences of shared arrangements in the national-security context).
54. GIANNI TONIOLO, CENTRAL BANK COOPERATION AT THE BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMENTS, 1930–1973, at 11–13, 320 (2005) (monetary cooperation); David Zaring, Finding Legal
Principle in Global Financial Regulation, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 685, 690–703 (2012).
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55

the 1970s. International financial regulation thus is understood to be a
56
necessary element of successful domestic financial regulation. International
regulatory engagement in other fields has been expanding in recent years, but
57
overall it is a less significant aspect of nonfinancial regulators’ agenda.
Although the EPA addresses regulatory issues of international scope—think
global warming—and undertakes a number of international environmental
programs, the bulk of its attention is still on domestic environmental issues, and
it has more sustained interactions with the states than with other nations or
58
international environmental organizations.
Further differences exist with respect to each field’s approach to private
regulation, though here the contrast is somewhat more muted. Reliance on
private actors is a central and recurring theme of financial regulation.
Supervisory responsibilities are delegated to private self-regulatory
organizations, like the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA),
59
which oversees the securities industry. Regulators increasingly require
evaluations by private third-party entities, such as rating agencies and auditors,
and measures developed by regulated entities to inform their own
60
decisionmaking are being included in regulatory schemes. The inclusion of
representatives of private member banks in the Fed’s institutional structure is
another manifestation of this incorporation of private actors into public
financial regulation.
Financial regulation stands out for the prominent oversight responsibilities
assigned to private regulators. But incorporation of private regulators is also
prevalent outside of the financial context, with similar use of self-regulation,
negotiated rulemaking, private standard-setting, and private enforcement in

55. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The Political Economy of International Financial Regulation, 88
IND. L.J. 1405, 1414–22 (2013).
56. See David Zaring, Sovereignty Mismatch and the New Administrative Law, 91 WASH. U. L.
REV. 59, 60–61 (2013).
57. See Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative
Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1543–60 (2006); Zaring, supra note 9, at 212–15 (describing the Treasury
Department’s involvement in international affairs).
58. See FY 2014: EPA Budget in Brief, EPA,
http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/
P100GCS2.PDF?Dockey=P100GCS2.PDF (last visited Apr. 4, 2015) (listing budget allocations by
program area, including international programs). A heavily domestic focus is particularly true of
federal administrative law generally, which applies only to units of the federal government and often
only to actions taken within U.S. territory. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012); see also Zaring, supra note 56, at 60–
61 (arguing that international regulation fits poorly within traditional administrative law paradigms).
59. See William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 22–24, 45–46 (2013); Donna M. Nagy, Is the PCAOB a “Heavily Controlled Component” of the
SEC?: An Essential Question in the Constitutional Controversy, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 362, 386 (2010);
Eric J. Pan, Understanding Financial Regulation, 26 (Cardozo Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 329,
2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1805018.
60. Jonathan R. Macey, The Regulator Effect in Financial Regulation, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 591,
605–08 (2013); Pan, supra note 59, at 28–29; Robert Weber, New Governance, Financial Regulation, and
Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of the Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy, 63
ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 785–86 (2010).
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multiple areas. New governance scholars have documented the rise of
collaborative public–private regulatory strategies, including at the EPA, and
62
privatization is dramatically expanding across the federal government. Citizen
suits, wherein private individuals are statutorily authorized to enforce
environmental laws and challenge the EPA’s actions, represent a particularly
prominent form of private involvement in the environmental context—one not
63
present with respect to financial regulation.
C. Regulatory Methods and Regulatory Approaches
A third difference between the EPA and the Fed concerns methods and
approaches to regulation. The EPA is known for its high-stakes legislative
rulemakings that set emissions limits and other requirements on a nationwide
and general basis. Key statutes implemented by the EPA not only require the
use of rulemaking to set governing standards, but also provide that standards be
reviewed on regular intervals and specify procedural requirements beyond
those ordinarily imposed on rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure
64
Act (APA). As noted, these rulemakings are often marked by substantial
public comment, political involvement, and frequent resort to litigation by those
unhappy with the agency’s regulatory choices. By contrast, the Fed operates
65
more informally and, to some extent, outside of the public eye. The main
drivers of Fed policy—such as the federal funds rate, discount rate, and reserve
requirements—are promulgated through Board releases or FOMC market
actions that never go through the notice-and-comment process or formal
66
external review prior to issuance. The Fed’s supervision of individual banks
takes an even more informal and continuous guise, with Fed bank examiners
located on site for the biggest banking institutions and assessing bank safety and
67
soundness on a principles-based and ongoing basis.
61. See Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law, 52
ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 820–28 (2000); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1367, 1377–92 (2003).
62. See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1,
55–57 (1997) (discussing Project XL, a collaborative program at the EPA); Orly Lobel, The Renew
Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 342, 373–76 (2004); Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 725, 733–
34 (2010).
63. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2012) (authorizing “any person” to commence a civil action against
any person who “is alleged to have violated” a requirement under the Clean Air Act or against the
EPA for failure to perform a non-discretionary duty under the statute); see also Robert L. Glicksman,
The Value Of Agency-Forcing Citizen Suits To Enforce Nondiscretionary Duties, 10 WIDENER L. REV.
353, 358–82 (2004) (impact of citizen suits on the EPA). Although financial regulatory statutes lack
citizen-suit provisions, the Court has taken a broad view of the zone-of-interest requirement of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, frequently allowing private individuals and entities to
challenge financial regulators’ treatment of third parties with whom they compete. See, e.g., Nat’l
Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 488–99 (1998).
64. See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(b)(1)(B), 7607(d) (2012).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 7–10.
66. See Conti-Brown, supra note 18, at 6–10.
67. See Kathryn Judge, Interbank Dicipline, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1262, 1287–88 (2013);
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Again, this contrast undoubtedly exaggerates differences in regulatory
method between the EPA and the Fed, and more generally between
administrative law and financial regulation. The Fed does engage in notice-andcomment rulemaking, as do other financial regulators—in particular the SEC,
68
and the SEC is more frequently subject to suit. In turn, the EPA issues many
more informal measures—guidance documents, manuals, plans, and the like—
than notice-and-comment rules and undertakes significant compliance and
69
enforcement activities. Still, the contrast in regulatory methods between
administrative law and financial regulation remains a real one. Despite growing
attention to more informal agency issuances, administrative law doctrine and
70
scholarship remains largely focused on notice-and-comment rulemaking. Many
financial regulators share the less-formal, less-rule-based, and less-litigated
71
regulatory approach of the Fed.
A related difference, one getting substantial attention of late, is the
importance of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to EPA rulemaking and
administrative law compared to its traditional absence from financial
regulation. Given their more limited reliance on legislative rulemaking, the Fed
and other financial regulatory agencies have had fewer occasions to undertake
CBA. More importantly, their independent-agency status has meant that most
financial regulators are exempt from the centralized Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) regulatory-review process under Executive Orders 12,866 and
72
13,563. This process, with its requirements that agencies produce cost-benefit
assessments for significant regulatory actions, has been the major force behind

Purposes and Functions, FEDERAL RESERVE, http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pf.htm (last visited
Apr. 3, 2015).
68. See Zaring, supra note 9, at 200, 208–09. According to the Federal Register website,
http://www.federalregister.gov, the SEC and CFTC together published 178 rules in the three-year
period from January 1, 2011 through January 1, 2014, compared to 113 rules for the Fed, FDIC, OCC
and OTS combined. Similarly, a Westlaw search reveals that there were 91 cases in the D.C. Circuit
(the prime federal court venue for administrative challenges) against the SEC and CFTC combined
(including 82 against the SEC alone) in that period, compared to 56 against the Fed, FDIC, OCC, and
OTS combined (Accessed by searching for: TI(Securities /3 “exchange commission”) TI(“Commodity
Futures trading commission”) & DA(aft 12/31/2010) & DA(bef 1/2/2014) compared to TI(“federal
reserve”) TI(“federal deposit insurance corporation”) TI(office /s comptroller /3 currency) TI(office /3
“thrift supervision”) & DA(aft 12/31/2010) & DA(bef 1/2/2014), both in the D.C. Circuit CADC
database).
69. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Counsel v. EPA, 643 F.3d 311, 319–21 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding
that an informally issued guidance document was a legislative rule that was required to go through
notice-and-comment process); Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency
Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 398–401, 405–06 (2007).
70. See Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1031, 1046 (2013)
(little attention given to enforcement); Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1354–55 (2012).
71. See supra note 67; Zaring, supra note 8, at 204–10 (describing the Treasury Department’s
functioning in similar terms).
72. See Exec. Order No. 13,563: Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821
(Jan. 18, 2011); Exec. Order No. 12,866: Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4,
1993).
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the development of CBA in federal regulation. Despite growing emphasis on
CBA in financial regulation, financial regulators remain significantly behind the
74
EPA and other major rulemaking agencies in their use of CBA.
Financial regulators’ comparative lack of CBA is somewhat surprising given
the presence of many economists on their staffs. The Fed in particular employs
a large number of highly qualified economists, including within its leadership,
75
such as the Fed Chair. But the Fed is not alone in this regard, with the SEC
76
similarly having a well-regarded cadre of economists and economic analysts.
Interestingly, the EPA also has a large staff of economists, which it has
77
deployed to help ensure its decisions survive OMB’s CBA of rulemaking.
Where the EPA and the Fed differ is that the EPA also employs a substantial
body of scientists, engineers, and other analysts, reflecting the scientific and
technological nature of the issues it is charged with addressing. Yet another
staffing difference concerns the role of lawyers. Lawyers can exert significant
influence over regulatory decisions at the EPA and other nonfinancial agencies,
given the looming risk of judicial review and reversal that agencies face,
78
particularly in major rulemakings. Lawyers have had less of a policy-setting
role at some financial regulators, with economists instead being the drivers of
79
regulatory choices.
D. The Role of the Market
A final contrast is more ephemeral and concerns the different goals and
perceptions that seem to dominate the worlds of administrative law and
financial regulation. At a broad level, regulators in both fields share similar
goals. They aim to advance individual and public well-being, but that entails
both protecting against undue risks and encouraging economic and
80
technological development. And though the cultures of different financial and
nonfinancial regulators may vary—the Fed is more frequently condemned for
73. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 72, at § 6; Robert Ahdieh, Reanalyzing Cost Benefit
Analysis, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1983, 1994–99 (2013) (discussing the role of presidential executive orders
in developing regulatory cost-benefit analysis).
74. See infra text accompanying notes 136–138; John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications 93–94 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working
Paper No. 234/2014, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2375396.
75. Coates, supra note 74, at 16 n.49.
76. See id.; Datla & Resz, supra note 12, at 325–27.
77. See Michael A. Livermore, Cost Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence, 81 U. CHI. L.
REV. 609, 626–36 (2014) (noting the high number of economically significant EPA rules reviewed by
OIRA).
78. DAVID L. HARFST & JERRY L. MASHAW, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 22–23, 93–105
(1990); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Powers Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032,
1043–44, 1046, 1054–55, 1079–80 (2011).
79. See Conti-Brown, supra note 18, at 52. This is true of the Fed and of some international
regulators, but less true of the SEC, which remains more lawyer dominated. Erik Sirri & Jennifer E.
Bethel, The Importance of Financial Policy Makers Making Informed Decisions, in CURRENT
PERSPECTIVES ON MODERN EQUITY MARKETS 94 (Sue Freese ed., 2010).
80. See, e.g., Our Mission and What We Do, supra note 13.
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the laxness of its oversight whereas the EPA is more frequently criticized for
imposing burdensome regulations—both agencies acknowledge the costs and
81
benefits of regulation and the need to account for unintended consequences.
Moreover, an agency’s culture and regulatory approach varies tremendously
according to the presidential administration in power and particular agency
leaders; simply compare the EPA of Anne Gorsuch under President Reagan
82
with the EPA of Lisa Jackson under President Obama.
Nonetheless, there is a difference in how financial and nonfinancial
regulators approach their tasks, and it is perhaps most apparent by focusing on
how each views the market. In the world of environmental, health, and safety
83
regulation, the market can be a useful tool of regulation. Fundamentally,
however, the market is viewed as needing to be controlled. In part, the goal is to
ensure that market actors are responsible for the full costs of their actions, such
84
as pollution or other environmental harms. But in addition, allowing free play
of the market is understood to represent a normative and political choice, one
that can be at odds with other political commitments, such as ensuring a safe
and healthy environment for all regardless of individual preferences or
85
resources.
Financial regulators also well understand the need for market controls to
protect individuals and guard against externalities or harmful incentives. But
the ostensible goal of financial regulation is often more to free the market to
function properly than to constrain it. Thus, for example, the danger of insider
trading is that it distorts the market, deposit insurance is needed to prevent
irrational behavior such as bank runs, and programs like quantitative easing are
intended to encourage firms to invest or expand at more appropriate levels. To
some extent, this difference is just a reflection of financial regulators’ specific
charge; after all, they are responsible for ensuring that financial markets
81. See Policy, Guidance & Publications, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/policy-guidancepublications (last visited Apr. 4, 2015); see generally Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of
EPA Rulemaking, 54 DUKE L.J. 57 (1991).
82. See Thomas O. Mcgarity, EPA At Helm’s Deep: Surviving The Fourth Attack On
Environmental Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 205, 207–09, 223–34 (2013).
83. See, for example, proposals for a greenhouse-gas cap-and-trade system. Amy Harder, EPA Set
to Unveil Climate Proposal, WALL ST. J. (May 26, 2014 8:04 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304811904579585843675203708 (discussing proposed EPA cap-and-trade program
for greenhouse-gas emissions); see also Cap and Trade Markets, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/captrade/
allowance-trading.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2015) (discussing allowance trading in the EPA’s acid rain
program).
84. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495,
1503–08 (1999) (describing market failures as an underlying cause of environmental harms); Mollie
Lee, Environmental Economics: A Market Failure Approach to the Commerce Clause, 116 YALE L.J.
456, 477–82 (2006) (describing forms of market failure triggering the need for environmental
regulation).
85. See David M. Driesen, Regulatory Reform: The New Lochnerism?, 36 ENVTL. L. 603, 646–49
(2006) (arguing that environmental legislation should and does embody value choices); see generally
FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING
AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) (arguing that economic analysis misunderstands the moral and
value-laden choices that underlie environmental law).
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function well. Moreover, in situations like the financial crisis, the intense focus
on market functioning reflects the fact that what triggered an immediate need
for regulatory intervention was a seizing up of the financial markets. Yet this
focus has the effect of obscuring the normative and political dimensions of
financial regulation behind the seeming neutrality of the market and economics.
Perhaps the clearest representation of this dynamic is the justification of central
bank independence on the grounds that insulation from politics helps ensure
bankers make economically driven decisions, thereby implying that
economically driven decisions are apolitical. Focusing on securing wellfunctioning markets similarly hides the normative issues involved in
determining what makes a market well-functioning. It also presents the market
as the arbiter of successful regulation, rather than an object to be regulated to
achieve separate policy goals.
II
RECENT TRANSFORMATIONS AND GROWING CONNECTIONS BETWEEN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND FINANCIAL REGULATION
Recognizing the ways in which administrative law and financial regulation
diverge raises two interesting questions. One is why these differences
developed, and the other is whether these differences will continue. Some of the
divergence may reflect substantive regulatory imperatives of each field. The
prevalence of central bank independence, for example, might suggest a
87
generally recognized need to insulate monetary policy from politics. In turn,
self-regulation allows government regulators to overcome information
disadvantages and gain better insights into complicated securities markets, as
88
well as to offload regulatory costs onto private actors.
On the whole, however, these differences between administrative law and
financial regulation appear more contingent than inherent and appear to turn in
large part on path dependency and political economy. Several financial
regulatory agencies are longstanding and emerged at a time when
administrative agencies had a more circumscribed footprint and narrower
89
delegated responsibilities. Industry desires for dedicated overseers, combined
with congressional and federal–state turf contests as well as agency selfprotection, have supported continuing to establish regulatory arrangements, or
perhaps adding new regulators with distinct slices of oversight, rather than

86. Coates, supra note 74, at 89–90.
87. See Conti-Brown, supra note 18, at 14–16.
88. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 59, at 55–56; Metzger, supra note 61, at 1471–73;
Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and its Public/Private Status,
90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 997–98 (2005); Pan, supra note 59, at 26–27.
89. See National Currency Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665–682 (creating the Office of the
Comptroller of Currency); Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified at 12 U.S.C. Ch. 3)
(creating the Federal Reserve System); RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 4–37 (5th ed. 2013) (describing historical overview of financial institutions).
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90

reconfiguring the existing financial regulatory landscape.
By contrast, the EPA was created at a time when the environmental
movement was growing in political power and against a backdrop of failure by
91
existing agencies to make environmental concerns a priority. Its cross-cutting
substantive focus and broad responsibilities reflect that genesis and represent
an effort to construct a consolidated regulatory structure that would be more
92
effective in addressing environmental problems.
Similarly, statutory
requirements of rulemaking and deadlines are characteristic of the public
interest era in which many of the nation’s major environmental statutes were
first adopted. The emphasis on cooperative federalism in environmental
93
statutes, in turn, stemmed in large part from political compromises.
Presidential struggles to assert control over the executive branch underlie the
increased emphasis on centralized regulatory review, but questions about the
President’s legal authority to oversee independent agency decisionmaking
explain why such review was limited to executive agencies, thereby excluding
94
financial regulators.
Another factor worth noting is the different paths that administrative law
and financial regulation took in the legal academy over the latter half of the
twentieth century. As federal administration shifted from an emphasis on
economic regulation in the post–New Deal era to an emphasis on
environmental and health risks in the 1960s and 1970s, the discipline of
administrative law transformed as well. It became solidly lodged in the publiclaw camp, populated with faculty whose interests lay largely in constitutional
law or the substantive areas that had become administrative law’s focus, such as
environmental and labor law. By contrast, as financial regulation dropped on
the political and administrative radar, it became more identified with the
business side and private-law side of law schools and more the bailiwick of
professors focused on economic analysis. This academic division has meant that
scholars from each field often have limited familiarity with the analytic
paradigms and core concerns that dominate the other, further reinforcing their
divergence.
Perhaps the clearest evidence of the contingency of the administrative law–
financial regulation divide, however, is the ways in which that divide is now
90. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 50, at 1140–45, 1152.
91. Gillian E. Metzger, The Story of Vermont Yankee: A Cautionary Tale of Judicial Review and
Nuclear Waste, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 124 (Peter L. Strauss, ed., 2005); Rabin, supra note
24, at 1298–1301.
92. The EPA was created by President Nixon in 1970 under his Reorganization Act authority and
represented a consolidation of extant staff and offices from several different agencies. See
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (July 9, 1970) (issued pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §
901); see also Richard A. Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer, Organizing Federal Food Safety Regulation, 31
SETON HALL L. REV. 61, 139–45 (2000) (describing background of the EPA’s creation).
93. See Dwyer, supra note 43, at 1197–99; Robert v. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical
Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1160–62, 1174–75 (1995).
94. See PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND
COMMENTS 214–17 (11th ed. 2011).
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collapsing. Recent developments in financial regulation in response to the
financial crisis are mitigating many of the contrasts identified above. The most
significant development in financial regulation in recent years—indeed, in
decades—was the enactment of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection (Dodd–Frank) Act. Dodd–Frank not only created
important new institutional structures; it imposed massive regulatory
responsibilities on financial regulators that involved highly politically charged
issues and that required close administrative coordination. Expanded agency
coordination is also a theme in recent administrative law contexts. Other
longer-term trends in administrative law, meanwhile, are pushing it closer to the
traditional financial regulation model. Of particular relevance are trends
towards greater informal and ad hoc regulatory approaches, regulatory
experimentation, and public–private collaboration. Yet at the same time that
the two fields are drawing closer together, their traditional features have not
entirely dissipated. As a result, each field can offer useful lessons on how similar
regulatory concerns might be pursued.
A. Structural Transformations: Independence, Accountability, and
Coordination
Dodd–Frank brought two particularly significant structural innovations to
the world of financial regulation: the creation of the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC) and the creation of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB). Chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury, the
FSOC consists of the chairs or heads of the other federal financial regulatory
agencies—the Fed, the OCC, the CFPB, the SEC, the CFTC, the Federal
Housing Finance Administration, and the National Credit Union
Administration—as its voting members, along with a presidentially appointed
independent member with insurance expertise. The FSOC is responsible for
identifying and responding to risks to the nation’s financial stability and has the
power to designate certain nonbank financial companies to be systemically
important and therefore subject to the Fed’s oversight. Another central part of
the FSOC’s role is to coordinate the activities of the nation’s financial
regulators, including recommending specific regulatory actions and priorities
95
and monitoring regulatory developments.
The creation of the FSOC can be seen as part of an effort to inject more
political accountability into financial-system oversight, a development that
Stavros Gadinis has identified as occurring globally after the recent financial
96
crisis. In the case of the FSOC, political accountability arises not simply from
the leadership role of the Treasury Secretary, a paradigmatic presidential “alter
97
ego” who is removable at will, but also from a number of procedural and
95. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321–33 (2012) (Dodd–Frank sections establishing the Financial Stability
Oversight Council).
96. See Gadinis, supra note 25, at 332–34.
97. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 686 n.1 (2008)
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substantive requirements. Certain key determinations, such as subjecting a
nonbank company to Fed supervision or invoking authority to orderly liquidate
a financial company, specifically require the Treasury Secretary’s approval and
98
involvement. More striking perhaps, the Treasury Secretary is required to
consult the President in making the determination of whether liquidation of a
99
financial institution is warranted. Several contexts require immediate
congressional notification of FSOC actions or (in the case of emergency
financial stabilization assistance) prior congressional authorization, and the
Government Accountability Office (GAO), Congress’s investigatory body, has
100
statutorily mandated audit and review responsibilities.
Yet, at the same time, the FSOC retains the strong independence features
typical of financial regulators. Other than the Treasury Secretary, the agencies
whose heads compose the FSOC are insulated from presidential and
congressional control, in some cases significantly so, and the President cannot
101
exclude certain financial regulators from the FSOC. Dodd–Frank sought to
create greater accountability and coordination largely by adding a new layer on
the top of existing arrangements rather than by integrating established
102
regulatory agencies. Key decisions like liquidation depend on acquiescence by
a supermajority of the FSOC and the relevant prudential regulators in addition
103
to the Treasury Secretary. Further, FSOC can only recommend specific
regulatory requirements or solutions to disagreements between agencies; it
104
cannot require that the agencies involved adopt such measures.
The CFPB represents a different structural approach, albeit one that
105
similarly links independence and accountability. Dodd–Frank consolidated
existing and new consumer financial-protection responsibilities in the CFPB,
giving it a streamlined, single-director internal structure and sole rulemaking

(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 133 (1926).
98. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5323, 5383 (2012); see also Gadinis, supra note 25, at 369–75; Jacob E. Gersen,
Administrative Law Goes to Wall Street: The New Administrative Process, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 689, 699
(2013).
99. See 12 U.S.C. § 5383 (2012).
100. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 5323, 5332, 5383, 5612 (2012); see also 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(2)(N) (2012)
(requiring annual congressional reports); 12 U.S.C. § 5322(b) (2012) (requiring individual attestation to
annual reports by each member of FSOC).
101. See Gersen, supra note 98, at 704–09; Vermeule, supra note 29, at 1195–99, 1218–22. The
independent member is appointed for a period of six years, but there is no express restriction on
removal. See 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2012).
102. See Cunningham & Zaring, supra note 48, at 42–45 (discussing alternative proposals); Gadinis,
supra note 25, at 368–75.
103. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376, § 203 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5383 (2012)).
104. See 12 U.S.C. § 5329(d) (2012) (“Any recommendation made by the Council [is not] binding
on the Federal agencies that are parties to the dispute.”).
105. See Susan Block-Lieb, Accountability and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 7
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 25, 29 (2012) (noting “political and procedural limits” that make the
CFPB “both independent and accountable” (emphasis in original)).
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106

authority in the areas within its ambit. Although the CFPB must consult with
prudential regulators when issuing rules, prudential regulators’ objections do
107
not prevent the CFPB from acting. In these respects, the CFPB is more like
the EPA, and its being headed by a single director rather than by a
108
multimember board is unusual for an independent agency. On the other hand,
like other financial regulators, the CFPB enjoys multiple levers of structural
109
independence, in particular removal protection and budgetary autonomy.
Two unique features of the CFPB are its location within the Fed and the
express provision for FSOC reversal of proposed CFPB rules, but it is unclear
how much significance these features will have in practice. The Fed expressly
lacks authority to overrule CFPB decisions, intervene in matters before the
CFPB, or limit its budget, and the FSOC can only reverse a CFPB rule if two110
thirds of its members publicly determine that specific conditions are met. In
any event, as both the Fed and the members of FSOC enjoy substantial
independence, neither of these mechanisms seems likely to yield greater
political influence over the CFPB.
As a result, though achieving greater accountability was an animating goal
behind the CFPB’s structure, the type of accountability sought was
programmatic accountability to the substantive goals of consumer financial
protection embodied in the statute rather than accountability to current
national political leaders. Consolidating consumer financial protection in a
single agency represented an effort to give this function a central priority that it
111
had lacked in the hands of prudential regulators. Requirements that the CFPB
must regularly report to and testify before Congress and receive GAO audits
have more of a political nexus, but the agency’s budgetary autonomy minimizes
112
Congress’s oversight power.
The FSOC’s and CFPB’s significance also lie in their restructuring of
relationships among financial regulators. The FSOC represents a vision of a
new world of financial regulatory coordination, one that provides a fulcrum
113
through which agencies can coordinate policies on systemic financial risks.
The CFPB provides a contrasting strategy for coordination, one in which a
106. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 5512, 5581(b)(1)(B) (2012); Gersen, supra note 98, at 706–07.
107. See 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2) (2012); Block-Lieb, supra note 105, at 46–47.
108. See Barkow, supra note 7, at 73–75, 77–78.
109. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5497(a)(1)–(3), 5491(a) (2012); Adam J. Levitan, The Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 339–40 (2013).
110. See 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1) (2012); see also 12 U.S.C. § 5513(c)(3)(A), (c)(6) (2012).
111. See Barkow, supra note 7, at 72–79; Block-Lieb, supra note 105, at 35–37; Levitan, supra note
109, at 367–68.
112. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5495, 5496(a)–(b), 5515, 5516 (2012); 12 U.S.C. § 5332 (2012) (providing for
GAO audit); 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(5)(A) (2012) (providing for audit by Comptroller General). Members
of Congress instead have sought to control the CFPB by blocking appointment of a CFPB director, but
filibuster reform put a stop to that strategy. See Helene Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate,
Obama Appoints Consumer Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2012, at A1.
113. See 12 U.S.C. § 5323(b) (2012); see also Floyd Norris, Financial Crisis, Over and Already
Forgotten, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2014, at B1.
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single agency is given regulatory primacy on an issue but is subject to
consultation requirements and enforcement constraints. Despite their different
responsibilities and scope, the simultaneous creation of the FSOC and the
CFPB creates an opportunity for assessing how these different approaches to
financial regulation coordination work in practice. Joint rulemaking efforts are
a third example of greater coordination, with a signal feature of the recent
Dodd–Frank-authorized Volcker rulemaking being the rule’s coordinated
114
issuance by five financial regulators—the Fed, FDIC, OCC, SEC, and CFTC.
Involving multiple regulators with different concerns helps ensure that a variety
of perspectives are taken seriously, but it also makes reaching agreement on a
regulatory strategy extremely difficult and provides more openings through
115
which negatively affected interests can seek to derail action.
In the administrative law context, the dominant structural theme for some
time has been expanded political accountability—in particular, greater
presidential oversight and control of agencies. With the debate largely framed
around the relationships between the White House and agencies, little attention
has been paid to potential benefits from combining independent and executive
agencies in a regulatory scheme. In that regard, administrative law and financial
regulation differ. But recent administrative law scholarship intent on breaking
down the categorical distinctions between independent and executive agencies,
as well as examining the FSOC and CFPB as case studies in institutional design,
116
may yield greater attention to such combinations.
The clearest administrative law link to structural trends in financial
regulation lies in a shared emphasis on interagency regulatory coordination. To
be sure, interagency coordination is a longstanding feature of many regulatory
schemes, and a major justification of the centralized White House regulatory
117
review process is to encourage better coordination among agencies. But in
recent years, coordination among federal regulators has become a much more
prominent feature of the administrative law landscape, as it has for financial
regulation. In part, this is a reflection of new legislative enactments. Thus, the
Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury have
undertaken joint rulemakings under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which

114. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Rep. No. GAO-14-282R, Commodity Futures Trading
Commission: Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and
Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds (2014), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/661136.pdf; see also Ryan Tracy, Banks, Agencies Draw Battle Lines
Over ‘Volcker Rule’, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2013, 8:54 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702304202204579252592600657058.
115. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 50, at 1181–85; Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies: Public
Choice and Public Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN PUBLIC LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 351–57
(Daniel A. Faber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010).
116. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 7, at 78; Datla & Revesz, supra note 12, at 825–27; Gersen, supra
note 98, at 693–708.
117. See S. DOC. NO. 73-12 (1933) (Copeland report); RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A.
LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE
ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 175–77 (2011); STRAUSS, supra note 94, at 758.

METZGER_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

150

5/8/2015 12:09 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 78:129

118

they all have responsibility to implement. It is also a feature of some
executive-branch initiatives, such as the recent joint rulemaking by the EPA
and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) on
119
automobile emissions. Another notable parallel to recent financial regulatory
transformations was the creation of a new Director of National Intelligence
(DNI) in the aftermath of September 11. Like the CFPB, the Department of
Homeland Security brought responsibility for domestic security operations,
previously dispersed across the federal establishment, into one agency, and, like
the FSOC, DNI’s role is to oversee and better coordinate existing intelligence
120
agencies.
B. Regulator Relationships Outside the Federal Government: Federal–State
and Public–Private
The growing focus on coordination in financial regulation and
administrative law is one example of transformed relationships among
regulators. Another area of change concerns the relationship between federal
and state financial regulators. The FSOC contains three representatives of state
financial regulators as nonvoting members—one representative each for
121
banking, securities, and insurance regulators. This incorporation of state
regulators is a departure from the dual banking system that long dominated the
nation. Insurance companies, for which the states remain the primary
regulators, are an important category of nonbank companies that may now
come under the Fed’s supervision as systemically important institutions. As a
result, new forms of federal–state interaction on insurance seem likely to
122
develop in the future. Similar involvement of the states is evident with respect
to the CFPB. Dodd–Frank makes clear that the states may bring actions
enforcing CFPB rules and that state protection measures are not preempted
123
unless they directly conflict with federal law. Agency culture and orientation
is an even more important factor here than formal inclusion. Richard Cordray,
the CFPB’s current Director, is a former state attorney general, and many of
the senior staff have state backgrounds, reflecting strong state commitment to
118. See, e.g., Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 77 Fed.
Reg. 70,620 (proposed Nov. 26, 2012) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 54, 2590 and 45 C.F.R. pts. 146–
47) (rule jointly proposed by Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury under
the ACA).
119. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 50, at 1169–73.
120. See O’Connell, supra note 53, at 1665–68.
121. See 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(2) (2012).
122. See Basis for the Financial Stability Oversight Council’s Final Determination Regarding
Prudential
Financial,
Inc.,
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY
(Sept.
19,
2013),
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/Prudential%20Financial%20Inc.pdf
(last visited Apr. 4, 2015).
123. See 12 U.S.C. § 5551 (2012) (relation to state law); 12 U.S.C. § 5552 (2012) (preservation of
enforcement powers of states); § 5552(b) (requiring States to consult with the CFPB before instituting
civil actions for subjects covered by the act); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 567, 582–84 (2011). Dodd–Frank also includes a unique provision requiring the CFPB to
seek public notice on a rulemaking petition filed by a majority of the states.
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consumer protection. Given that commitment, the states are obvious allies for a
CFPB committed to consumer protection, and the agency has coordinated
124
closely with the states in the past.
Similar expansions in federal–state cooperation mark the current
administrative law landscape. Several of the Obama administration’s major
regulatory initiatives, such as the health exchanges under the ACA or the
EPA’s proposals to regulate greenhouse gases, put heavy emphasis on the
125
states. These initiatives were structured to grant the states substantial
discretion, but in practice that has not always transpired. For example,
substantial state resistence to the ACA resulted in a far greater federal role in
running the health exchanges than initially envisioned. In other contexts, most
notably education, the federal government has used administrative waivers to
grant the states more discretion than the governing statutes directly provide.
Moreover, while state financial regulators complain about their limited role in
the FSOC, nonfinancial regulators have been more intent on wooing states to
126
participate in federal regulatory schemes.
Clear trends are harder to identify with respect to public–private
relationships. Private regulation remains an important element of financial
regulation, but Dodd–Frank did require greater oversight of some third-party
127
intermediaries and self-regulating bodies. Similar calls for greater oversight of
private contractors are a feature of administrative law scholarship on
privatization but have been met with uneven success, and the growth in
128
privatization through contracting continues apace.
Dodd–Frank also
represents a rethinking of the deregulatory strategies that dominated financial
regulation in the lead-up to the financial crisis, with far greater emphasis now
129
placed on governmental regulatory policing. A similar proregulatory bent is
evident outside of financial regulation, with leading examples being reform of
130
the health insurance market and new initiatives on climate change. Such
moves towards greater regulation in both fields remain politically contentious,
124. Inclusion of state regulators on the FSOC has not been as successful a collaboration, with the
state members regularly complaining about resistance from federal regulators. See Metzger, supra note
123, at 584–85.
125. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,834 (June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. Pt. 60)
[hereinafter Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines]; Metzger, supra note 123, at 572–81, 594–97, 604–
07.
126. Metzger, supra note 123, at 610–18.
127. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3(a)(1) (setting forth listing standards); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c, 78o-7 (enhancing
regulation of rating agencies); Macey, supra note 60, at 613–16.
128. Michaels, supra note 62, at 722–23, 730.
129. Compare Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C. (2, 5, 7, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20,
22, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 41, 42, 44, 49, and 112)), with Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, Pub L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1228 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.), and Edmund L.
Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at B1.
130. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, supra note 125; Metzger, supra note 123, at 595–97,
602–05.
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and thus their staying power is difficult to predict. But to the extent they do,
they represent a rebalancing of the relationship between private-market
arrangements and public regulation.
C. Transformed Regulatory Approaches
One area of pronounced change, for both financial regulation and
administrative law, concerns regulatory approaches. Here the increased linkage
between the two fields is particularly evident, as the methodological changes in
each field move it closer to the other.
Financial regulation has become more centered on rulemaking, more public,
and more reliant on CBA. Dodd–Frank is significantly responsible for the
increase in rulemaking, as it requires a massive number of rulemakings by
131
financial regulators. Moreover, Dodd–Frank also imposes relatively tight
deadlines for its required rulemakings, further reinforcing the new focus on
132
rulemaking in the financial regulator world. This expanded rulemaking has
contributed to financial regulation’s greater publicity, bringing financial
regulation more into the public eye with a number of high-profile
133
rulemakings. And the CFPB has played a role as well, seeking from its
inception to encourage greater public engagement in the agency’s regulatory
134
and supervisory tasks. But perhaps the most basic cause of financial
regualtion’s higher public profile is greater public skepticism of financial
135
institutions and regulators since the financial crisis.
The most significant methodological development in financial regulation,
however, is the increased emphasis on CBA. This development is partially
traceable to Dodd–Frank’s emphasis on new financial regulation and its
requirements that regulators consider costs and benefits in a few specific
136
contexts. But the prime mover in the rise of CBA in financial regulation is the
D.C. Circuit. In several decisions dating back to 2005, the D.C. Circuit held that
new statutory requirements that the SEC consider the impact of its rules on
“efficiency, competition, and capital formation” required the agency to assess
131. See Paul Rose & Christopher J. Walker, Dodd–Frank Regulators, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and
Agency Capture, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 9 (2013); Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Dodd–Frank
Progress Report, http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/Progress.Report.May2014.pdf (last visited
Apr. 4, 2015) (208 of 398 required rulemakings finalized as of May 1, 2014).
132. See Gersen, supra note 98, at 724–25.
133. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don't Screw “Joe the Plumber”: The Sausage–Making of Financial
Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 70–82 (2013) (detailing the extent of public involvement in the Volker
Rule promulgation).
134. See Ethan Bernstein, Leonard J. Kennedy & Patricia A. McCoy, The Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau: Financial Reform for the Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1158–59,
1164–65 (2012).
135. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Annual Meeting of the
American Economic Association: The Federal Reserve: Looking Back, Looking Forward (Jan. 3,
2014), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20140103a.htm.
136. See Coates, supra note 74, at 2–3; see, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5512 (requiring the CFPB to consider
“the potential benefits and costs to consumers and covered persons, including the potential reduction of
access by consumers to consumer financial products or services resulting from such rule”).
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137

the costs of proposed regulations. In the years since, the court has overturned
several SEC rules for inadequate consideration of costs, most prominently in its
138
2011 invalidation of the SEC’s proxy access rule in Business Roundtable.
The growing importance of CBA in financial regulation creates an obvious
parallel to administrative law. Yet there are important differences worth
underscoring. One is substantive and concerns the extent to which costs and
benefits of financial regulation can be determined with any meaningful and
139
useful accuracy. In truth, this complaint has been long raised by critics of
CBA in other regulatory contexts, who contend that such assessments are prone
to manipulation, turn on undeterminable variables, and can be at odds with
140
statutory policy choices. Where the difference lies is not in the criticism, but in
the greater support and traction that the criticism has received from regulators
and academics in the context of financial regulation.
The second, more significant difference is institutional. In the administrative
law context, CBA requirements overwhelmingly rest on the executive orders
that impose centralized regulatory review and are enforced by OIRA. These
requirements are expressly an executive-branch matter, with the orders
141
explicitly precluding judicial enforcement. Moreover, the presence of an
elaborate internal executive-branch process has likely forestalled judicial
142
inclination to read cost-benefit assessment requirements into statutes. Thus,
the opportunity for courts to reject agency cost-benefit assessments as arbitrary
in violation of the APA is significantly minimized. Equally important, the
executive orders have led nonfinancial regulators to develop greater
sophistication in their approach to cost-benefit assessment, and they can also
143
rely on OIRA expertise and guidance. By contrast, CBA requirements for
financial regulators are rooted in statutes, and the prime external reviewers of
agency analyses are the courts. And the courts are a particularly poor institution
144
for such review. Courts not only lack agency substantive expertise, access to
137. See 15 U.S.C §§ 78c(f), 80a-2(c); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133,143 (D.C. Cir.
2005); see also Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30
YALE J. ON REG. 289, 298–308 (2013) (detailing D.C. Circuit litigation under the ECCF requirement
and earlier, in the lead up to Business Roundtable).
138. See Coates, supra note 74, at 24–29; Kraus & Raso, supra note 137, at 303–19. But see Nat’l
Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Business Roundtable has received substantial
scholarly criticism. See Kraus & Raso, supra note 137, at 292 n.12 (collecting sources).
139. Compare Coates, supra note 74, at 88–91, with Rose & Walker, supra note 131, at 12, and Eric
Posner & Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Analysis for Financial Regulation 5, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 393–97,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2188990##.
140. See Christopher H. Schroeder & Sidney A. Shapiro, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A
Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433, 457–59 (2008).
141. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 72; Exec. Order No. 13,563, supra note 72, at § 10.
142. For an instance when the Court nonetheless has done so, see Entergy v. Riverkeeper, 556 U.S.
508 (2009).
143. See Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 1342, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Livermore, supra note
77, at 639–66; Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1755, 1791–92 (2013).
144. Coates, supra note 74, at 24–29.
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data, and CBA expertise, but in addition, they perform their reviews ex post,
once a rule is finally promulgated, and are much less predictable in their
reviews, given the importance that judicial-panel composition can play in
145
judicial review of regulation.
Oddly, as financial regulation has moved more towards a heavy rulemaking
focus, administrative law has headed in the opposite direction, towards more
informal and contingent forms of regulation. Charles Sabel and William Simon
maintain that there is a trend towards contextualized administrative regimes, in
which public officials and private stakeholders jointly derive governing norms
146
and the emphasis is on experimentation and evolution. A separate, more
longstanding trend is a move away from notice-and-comment rulemaking and
toward increasing use of guidance, policy statements, and other informal agency
147
actions.
A pronounced example of this movement towards more ad hoc and
informal regulation is the recent increase in the use of waivers in administrative
law contexts. Although waivers for exceptional cases are a well-established
feature of administrative regimes, a different type of waiver has surfaced in
recent years—one involving waiver of basic statutory requirements underlying a
regulatory scheme. These “big waivers,” as David Barron and Todd Rakoff
have called them, are undertaken pursuant to statutory waiver authority but
148
serve to fundamentally transform the administrative programs at issue. The
result is a dramatic increase in discretionary administration, with agency
officials fashioning new regulatory arrangements to address the particulars of
specific entities. And it creates a close parallel to the actions of prudential
financial regulators, with their heavily discretionary oversight of particular
financial institutions. Indeed, perhaps the nearest analogy is to the actions of
the Fed during the financial crisis, when it responded to unfolding events with
highly discretionary, ad hoc arrangements of major significance that often
149
deviated from established practices.
III
CONCLUSION: EMERGENT LESSONS
In short, today is a period of dramatic change for both administrative law
and financial regulation. Despite their shared focus on government regulation
145. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 846–
50 (2008).
146. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes: Institutionalization as a
Response to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1266–68
(2012); see also Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 82 (2011).
147. See, e.g., Connor R. Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance
Documents, 119 YALE L.J. 782, 815 (2010).
148. See David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265,
277–79 (2013).
149. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 19, at 477–79.
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and administration, these fields evolved in significantly different directions over
the decades since the New Deal. Administrative law traditionally emphasized
broad political accountability, rulemaking, judicial review, and cooperation with
the states; financial regulation, on the other hand, put primacy on
independence, informal oversight, private regulation, and market forces. But
now these differences are breaking down, with each moving towards the
regulatory paradigms and key approaches of the other. As a result, this is a
moment in which each field can gain important lessons from the other. Some of
those lessons are already being explored. Administrative law and financial
regulation scholars are increasingly turning to each others’ fields for insights on
agency structure and accountability. The FSOC and CFPB are prime targets of
study for both, offering real-life examples against which to test theoretical
arguments for greater coordination, independence, and political accountability.
150
Cross-pollination is evident in the context of CBA. There are also some
lessons that each field has yet to fully embrace. Administrative law scholars
have more to mine from financial regulation on the range of public–private
interactions. Financial regulation offers an important window on the advantages
and drawbacks of greater incorporation of private actors into regulatory
schemes. Some financial regulatory scholars have begun to study financial
151
regulation with an eye to this question, but privatization scholarship on the
administrative law side remains focused on nonfinancial contexts and, in
152
addition, on contracting out and privatizing service provision. In turn,
financial regulation could benefit from engaging more with administrative law’s
approach to federal–state relationships. The field remains heavily federal in
153
focus, and federalism discussions are largely limited to preemption. This
leaves unexplored the possibilities for more innovative state roles in
implementing federal financial regulation.
But the most important lesson administrative law holds for financial
regulation is the inevitability of politics. For the first sixty years of the twentieth
century, during the period when the modern administrative state was born, the
dominant administrative law model was one of neutral expertise, and
administrative agencies were viewed as merely transmitting legislative policy
choices into the world. Over the ensuing decades, this account was cast aside,
replaced by a vision of agencies as fundamentally political, exercising broad
discretion and formulating policies as compromises among competing interest

150. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 7, at 33–34; Kraus & Raso, supra note 137, at 340.
151. See Conti-Brown, supra note 18, at 50–51; Macey, supra note 60, at 592.
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groups. Once agencies were seen as largely making legislative choices among
competing interests, increased political accountability became essential for their
155
legitimacy. By contrast, the neutral expertise model continued to dominate
financial regulation, fueled by financial regulation’s emphasis on the market
156
and economic principles. The traditional insulation of financial regulators
both depended on and served to reinforce this image of neutrality. But the
financial crisis has brought politics front and center in financial regulation.
Financial regulation is now faced with the challenge that administrative law has
struggled with for much of the last half century: how to combine neutral
expertise with politically accountable administration. Administrative law holds
insights for how to address this challenge, the first step of which is forthright
acknowledgement of the inescapably political nature of governmental
regulation.
Indeed, the political nature of regulation is perhaps more evident today than
at any point in recent American history. Increasing party polarization means
vanishingly few areas of regulatory consensus and all-out attacks on
administrative governance. These new heights of political contestation in
administration—administration as a “blood sport,” according to Tom
157
McGarrity and Arthur Levitt —are the new shared reality for all federal
regulators, financial and nonfinancial alike. Going forward, the dominant
contrast is unlikely to be between administrative law and financial regulation,
but rather between proregulatory and antiregulatory forces.
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